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PROBLEMS WITH SHARING THE PIRATES' BOOTY:
AN ANALYSIS OF TRIPS, THE COPYRIGHT
DIVIDE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CHINA & TWO
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Manesh Jiten Shah*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is essential for a capitalist society to guarantee that techno-
logical innovation remains the work product of its originator so that
there is an incentive to research and develop new products. At the
same time, however, society must have many sellers in a market and
ensure that no one company monopolizes the market for any one
highly demanded product. Monopolies subject the supply and demand
curves to idiosyncratic conditions creating inefficient and inequitable
solutions.' Consequently, a balance must be struck between those two
goals of giving the creator the exclusive right to his/her creation, and
the free market enough producers and suppliers to prohibit
monopolies.
Software programming is an emerging specialty within the in-
tellectual property field. While software programming represents a
relatively small portion of total international commerce, it has signifi-
cant impacts on companies world-wide. The United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission estimated that domestic companies lost
approximately $50 billion to software piracy in 1988. ' As a result, in
1995, during the World Trade Organizations' Uruguay round of negoti-
ations, the United States government created an accord with other na-
tion-states also concerned about piracy, and the result was the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) regime.3 This
international covenant intended to establish standards of protections
against software pirates, determine rules of enforcement, and set up a
dispute settlement mechanism to resolve issues between member
* J.D. candidate, 2006, University of Richmond School of Law; B-A., 2001, Austin
College.
1 See generally ADAN S iTm, WEALTH OF NATIONS 11776).
2 Advisory Committee for Trade Policy Negotiations, A Report to the President,
Congress, and the United States Trade Representative Concerning the Uruguay
Round of Negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 67 (1994).
3 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instru-
ments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol.31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter TRIPS].
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States.' This attempt at a comprehensive solution theoretically ap-
pealed to both developing and developed nation-states with regards to
international business transactions because it created evenhanded
resolutions to several problem areas such as maritime services, tele-
communications, financial services and intellectual property.5 Not-
withstanding the attempts to mitigate piracy in the international
arena by TRIPS, or in the domestic arena by the United States Federal
Government, worldwide financial losses to business software piracy in
2001 - a full six years after TRIPS was established - rose to an esti-
mated $11 billion.6
This Comment attempts to illuminate the effect of software
piracy on the United States economy by analyzing, from an interna-
tional perspective, the current system of preventing, punishing and re-
covering from such activities. Part II of this comment analyzes how
TRIPS operates in an attempt to show current enforcement mecha-
nisms and certain areas of vulnerability. Part III focuses on why devel-
oping nation-states are largely the home of software pirates with a
case study of present day China compared to the early United States
history of "pirating" copyrighted novels. Part IV considers an alterna-
tive to the current TRIPS system by incorporating "shrink-wrap li-
censing" and other alternatives into current enforcement mechanisms.
Part V provides a possible resolution of the problem and attempts to
synthesize the effects of piracy on segments of the United States'
economy.
II. ANALYZING TRIPS
Louis Henkin flippantly asserted "almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obliga-
tions almost all of the time."7 Applying this to international piracy
law, Henkin's statement suggests nation-states dispose of interna-
tional law like TRIPS because adhering to any international agree-
ment seems up to the prerogative of individual States under some
notion of sovereignty. There are two dominant reasons why nation-
states adhere to international covenants. First, "[tihe fundamental in-
strument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an acceptable
level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty
TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 64.
' http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm.
6 Note, Tackling Global Software Piracy Under Trips: Insights from International
Relations Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2003); INT'L PLANNING & RE-
SEARCH CORP., SEVENTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SoTrwARE PIRACY STUDY 2 (2002).
7 Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEi-IAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
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organization, and the wider public."' Essentially the threat of sanc-
tions is not the reason for compliance, but nations are "persuaded to
comply by the dynamic created by the treaty regimes."9 Economists
concur that businesses focused on maintaining repeat customers offer
a higher quality product. By analogy, if a nation-state knows several
foreign companies want to continue business for many years, then they
will enact laws to protect the foreign company's rights because nation-
states see the benefit to their domestic economy. A second reason for
compliance is that moral, normative and legal reasons all play a role in
creating a rule which will be followed because it makes intuitive sense
to the actor." Meaning, "[a] transnational actor's moral obligation to
obey an international norm becomes an internally binding domestic
legal obligation when that norm has been interpreted and internalized
into its domestic legal system." 1 As rational agents, governments will
act according to the international norms when they are persuaded it is
in their best interests and an efficient and equitable solution will flow
from their compliance. Regardless of why nation-states are persuaded
to comply with international agreements, any international law must
make sense to those nation-states individually, otherwise the laws be-
come mere puffery and the lack of domestic enforcement leads to non-
compliance with the treaty."
The first indicium that TRIPS is a fair law is to ask if TRIPS
can be internalized by nation-states who have agreed to it. Currently,
many states view TRIPS as a regime that "despite its contractually
obligatory nature. . . [it] is capable of manipulation, distortion, and
even abandonment if such actions serve the interests of the states."13
Since the nation-states which belong to the treaty agreement have a
variety of local economic, legal and social customs,' 4 TRIPS jurists
ought to take local customs into account,15 specifically to help nation-
states internalize the agreement into their local customs. For example,
ABRAm CHAYEs & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLI-
.ANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATOR AGREEMENTS 3 (1995).
9 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2601 (1997).
10 Id., 2659.
11 Id.
12 See generally 116 HARV. L. REV. at 1144.
13 Id. at 1146.
14 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and the Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 275, 292 (1997).
'5 Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agree-
ment: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357,
411 (1998) (arguing that TRIPS jurists should openly take local circumstances into
consideration).
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in the United States, a sporadically enforced TRIPS agreement would
be insufficient because the domestic economy is dependant on high-
technology companies, 6 and only partial enforcement of the TRIPS
agreement would violate the Due Process Clause. 17 Random enforce-
ment of any law by the federal or a state government violates the Due
Process Clause by applying different laws to two similarly situated
people."1 As a result, the United States Congress enacted Section 182
of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1974, which requires an annual review of
the intellectual property laws of trading partners and sanctions those
nations whose laws are deemed unfair.19 This local custom, employed
by the United States, is not mandatory for all TRIPS members. How-
ever, the United States deemed it necessary in order align the interna-
tional agreement with its Constitution. Since any nation has the
power to decide with whom to trade, this law is not a de facto violation
of TRIPS. The example further reiterates the argument that any inter-
national law will be followed to the extent it can be internalized.2"
The second indicium that TRIPS is a fair law is to ensure that
it is consistently fair to all nation-states adopting the rule. If the law is
perceived as being unfair, then members will see no reason to enforce
the treaty as adopted, and the treaty will turn into mere rhetoric.
Structural designs such as the centralization of enforcement mecha-
nisms, transparency measures, and the degree of flexibility allotted to
individual states all point to the fairness of the TRIPS regime.2 1
The enforcement mechanism for TRIPS lies in a looming threat
of reciprocal trade sanctions which seek to sustain cooperation and in-
duce compliance over time.2 2 This enforcement policy is fair on its face
because TRIPS created a Council to hear all disputes and make deci-
sions as a part of its mediation.2 3 However, many nation-states rely on
domestic legislation to hear a TRIPS claim. So the cost of adjudicating
16 The U.S. intellectual property trade surplus exceeded $20 billion in 2000. Bus.
SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, FORECASTING A ROBUST FUTURE 3 (1999), at http://www.bsa.
org/usa/globallib/econ/us econ study99.pdf.
17 U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
18 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
19 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §182, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975).
20 See supra note 8.
21 See Ronald B. Mitchell & Patricia M. Keilbach, Situation Structure and Institu-
tional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange, 55 INT'L ORG. 891, 196-99
(2001) (arguing what parts need to be in place for any international regime to be
considered fair).
22 ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOM-Y 244-45 (1984); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 57-60 (1990); see 116 HARv. L. REV. at 1150-51.
23 116 HARV. L. REV. at 1152.
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a dispute becomes a major factor which prohibits parties from seeking
remedies before the TRIPS council.2"
To maintain a level of transparency in its decision making pro-
cess, the TRIPS Council issues written questions in advance of its
meetings so that nation-states brought in as either offending parties or
defenders of a local rule may formulate written responses. The meet-
ing allows follow-up questions as well as replies.2 5 Any nation-state
under review is allowed the chance to present their current TRIPS leg-
islation and any changes executed to comply with TRIPS. After the
nation-state's presentation, the Council may ask additional ques-
tions.2" The public nature of Council meetings, along with the number
of member states which are present, ensures that a nation-state need
not worry that a reprehensible adjudication will go unnoticed by other
nation-states. This level of transparency is parallel to other interna-
tional institutions like the General Assembly meetings at the United
Nations.
The third indicium of fairness is the degree of flexibility al-
lowed to each nation-state. Although the current TRIPS regime is
considered flexible because it accounts for local custom explicitly,28
there are at least two potential solutions which would allow a better
tailoring of TRIPS to various legal customs. First, nation-states could
give private domestic corporations a greater role in the global govern-
ance of intellectual property rights protection. 29 This would allow
those companies to bargain around the TRIPS agreement so that the
TRIPS regime becomes the basis of a contract."0 Around this basis,
market players may mutually tailor the contract to their benefit. 3 '
This would be advantageous to the corporation selling the product be-
cause the rules of the game would be known and any unfavorable fac-
tual scenario can be considered in advance. Additionally, the consumer
would also understand the requirements behind the agreement and
perhaps internalize the contract - thereby creating a better chance of
24 Id.
25 See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 23(4) (establishing a Council to negotiate a multi-
lateral register of geographical indications, in this case, for wine).
26 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1996 Report
of the Council for TRIPS, WTO Doc. IP/C/8, PP4-25 (Nov. 6, 1996), available at
httpJ/www.wto.org.
27 See supra note 19.
28 See e.g. supra note 14 (mandating TRIPS jurists to consider local customs).
29 116 HARv. L.REv. at 1157.
30 116 HARV. L. REV. at 1157-58; see also J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargain-
ing Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatiues
to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. CoNP. &
INT'L L. 11, 60 (1998).
31 Id.
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self-enforcement. Thus, all terms that one party might deem inappro-
priate can be eliminated by savvy businessmen via rounds of negotia-
tions. Second, non-governmental organizations "can aid states,
particularly developing states, in complying with the outcome-based
TRIPS provisions"3 2 by assisting with legislative drafting, promulgat-
ing legal norms, and educating the public about the benefits of the
TRIPS regime.3 3 Two non-governmental organizations, the Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Alliance and the Business Software Alli-
ance, have shown a dedicated interest in China's and other nation-
states' compliance with the TRIPS regime.3 4 Both of these non-govern-
mental solutions ought to be written into the TRIPS framework either
explicitly, or implicitly, so that the standards are applied consistently
and fairly to all nation-states.
The TRIPS agreement is one of the most comprehensive at-
tempts to align nation-states into agreement regarding rights for for-
eign companies and their work products. TRIPS is flexible because it
allows nation-states to create their own laws with regards to domestic
problems, and it is consistent because the same procedure for dispute
resolution exists regardless of the nation-state in question. These ben-
efits, in addition to a transparent process, make the TRIPS system a
fair international law which can be internalized by various nation-
states with different priorities.
III. THE GREAT COPYRIGHT DIVIDE OF CHINA AND THE EARLY
UNITED STATES
'While copyright holders are eager to protect what they have,
many users neither understand copyright law nor believe in the sys-
tem. As a result, copyright piracy is rampant and illegal file sharing
has become the norm rather than the exception."3 5 Following copy-
right laws comes from believing and understanding the reasons for
government action. This section highlights the recourse available to
any businesses inside a domestic arena, giving special attention to the
United States' manuscript piracy historically versus modern China's
electronic piracy in a comparative case study, and the international
solution when consumers violate copyright treaties.
32 116 HARv. L. REV. at 1159.
33 Id.
34 Serri E. Miller, The Posse Is Coming to Town... Maybe: The Role of United
States Non-Governmental Organizations in Software Anti-Piracy Initiatives as
China Seeks WTO Accession, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111, 121 (2000); U.S. Help
Is Sought in Fight in Singapore Against Counterfeiters, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1998,
at All.
35 Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 331 (2003).
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Domestically, the United States has seen high profile litigation
between university students and the recording industry (whose copy-
righted music is often the subject of an illegal taking) who seek billions
of dollars in damages.3 6 Yet this recourse of suing for pecuniary dam-
ages has not always been available in the United States. A little over
two centuries ago, the United States was notoriously known for its pi-
rating of books.3 7 The Constitution states 'Congress shall have
Power.. .to promote the Progress of Science.. .by securing for limited
Times to Authors.. .the exclusive Right to their respective Writings."38
The first copyright statute, passed in 1790, limited copyright protec-
tion to "a citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident
therein.-"' Section Five of that Act explicitly discriminated against for-
eign authors and inventors:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to extend to pro-
hibit the importation or vending reprinting or publishing
within the United States, of any map, chart, book or
books, written, printed, or published by any person not a
citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places
without the jurisdiction of the United States.4
This created an unfair advantage to American publishers because
their British counterparts could not compete in the open market as
American businesses could sell at a cheaper price.4 1 "Compared to a
legitimate English edition, an American pirated edition cost approxi-
matelv one-tenth of the total cost."4 2 The tides turned once American
literature began to flourish.43 Because copyright laws at the time were
made conditional upon reciprocity between two nations, American au-
36 Frank Ahrens, 4 Students Sued ouer Music Sites, WA _SH. POST, Apr. 4. 2003, at
El; Jon Healey, Students Hit with Song Piracy Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4. 2003,
at 1.
37 Tomas Bender & David Sampliner, Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American
Literature, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 255, 255 (1997) (arguing that during its
formative period, the United States failed to observe foreign intellectual property
rights and did not sign any agreements to that end until the end of the nineteenth
century).
U.S. Co.,,r. art. I, § S, cl. 8.
9 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15. 1 Stat. 124.
40 Id. §5.
41 S. .STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS §2.18, at
25 (2d ed. 1989).
42 Supra note 32 at 341-42; see also SIVA V.MDHY-'LNATHAN. COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF IN'TELLECTUAL PROPERTY .ND How IT THREATENS CREA-
Tivr 44 (2001).
43 Supra note 32 at 344.
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thors continued to be denied their rights under foreign law just as for-
eign authors were denied rights in the United States.4 4
Yet today, the United States is "no longer the notorious pirate
it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Rather, it has be-
come the champion of literary and artistic property and one of the pre-
dominant powers advocating strong intellectual property protection
around the world."4 Historic evidence indicates that the United
States changed from pirate to protector because it had a vested inter-
est in ensuring its own citizens were protected. 4 ' The shift in policy
resulted from internalizing the benefits of international copyright
agreements, the exact same justification used for creating trans-
parency in the TRIPS Council.4 7
Scholars credit China for contributing paper, movable type and
ink to humanity, but "China has yet to develop comprehensive protec-
tion for what is created when one applied inked type to paper."48 In
fact "financial losses from [Chinese] piracy have become so severe that
some businesses will no longer release software"4 9 in developing na-
tion-states like China.5 ° The situation is not unique to China. In 1997,
I visited Bangalore, known as the "Silicon Valley" of India. I walked
down a major street and found pirated CDs of Windows '95 or other
Microsoft products on sale by street vendors for Rs. 100 - about $2.50
at the time.
Among the first treaties signed shortly after China's reopening
to the world after Mao Tse-tung's death in the late 1970s,5 1 was a
treaty initiated by the United States about trade relations. 2 Provi-
44 Max Kempelman, TheUnited States and International Copyright, 41 Am. J.
INT'L L. 413, 413 (1947) (noting Longfellow's assertion that he had twenty-two
publishers in England and Scotland, but that "only four of them took the slightest
notice of my existence, even so far as to send me a copy of the book." Harriet
Beecher Stowe is reported to have received no return on her book Uncle Tom's
Cabin even though it sold more than 500,000 copies in Great Britain during its
first year alone).
45 Supra note 32 at 352.
46 Id.; see DEBORA J. HALBERT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE:
THE POLITICS OF EXPANDING OWNERSHIP RIGHTS 79 (1999).
47 See supra note 19; supra note 23.
48 WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 1 (1995); see supra note 32 at 354.
49 Kurt Foss, Will Software Piracy Fears Keep Adobe Products Out of China?,
PLANET PDF (Feb. 4, 2002) at http://www.planetpdf.comlmainpage.asp?
webpageid= 1891.
.50 Id.
51 IMMANUEL C.Y. Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 858 (6th ed. 2000).
52 Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 31 U.S.T. 4652.
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sions for intellectual property included a caveat: "each Party shall
seek, under its laws and with due regard to international practice, to
ensure a legal or natural persons of the other Party protection of pat-
ents and trademarks equivalent to the patent and trademark protec-
tion correspondingly accorded by the other Party."53 This return to
reciprocal copyright status with other nations is reminiscent of the
first agreements between the United States and European nations
when American authors where being denied copyright protection in
the nineteenth century.5 4
China's agreement with the United States came before the Chi-
nese government had a chance to establish internal laws and regula-
tions regarding copyright violations.5 5 This meant that China.'assumed an international legal obligation for intellectual property
rights protection before it had established a domestic intellectual prop-
erty protection system." 6 In 1980, China joined the World Intellectual
Property Organization." In 1995, China became a member of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. China
has even passed two domestic laws regarding trademarks5 9 and
patents .*o
Even with the enactment of all of these agreements and laws,
"China afforded authors and inventors very limited protection." ' In
fact some industry experts claim that 99% of all computer software in
China was pirated in the late 1990s.6 2 Much of this illegal taking came
about because of a misunderstanding of the copyright system.6 3 Chi-
nese people were under a socialist economic system whereby property
did not reside in any person, but in the state and the people as a
whole.64 After a break in U.S.-Sino relations. "many Chinese saw a
higher stake in pirating foreign technologies than protecting them. To
many of them, intellectual property rights were not tools to promote
r3 Id. art. VI3) 31 U.S.T. at 4658.
5 Supra note 41.
55 See generally HONG XUE & CHENGSI ZHENG. SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA: A
CowLETE GUIDE (1999) [hereinafter Xue & Zheng].
5 Id. at 5.
57 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14. 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538.
58 Id.
" Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in THE LAw OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979-1982, at 305 (1987).
o Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in THE Lkw OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979-1982, at 65 (1987).
61 25 C.kDozo L. REV. at 356.
62 Xue & Zheng, supra note 51, at 31.
63 25 CARDozo L. REV. at 361.
6 Id. at 362.
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the country's economic development, foreign investment and interstate
relations. 16 5 This inability to internalize the previous agreements with
the United States and other nations meant that the Chinese saw the
laws as slowing down economic progress.6 6 Moreover, they were afraid
that following such policies would lead China down the "path of the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe - toward economic decay, so-
cial unrest, and political instability. '67 All of this history is analogous
to the American tale written above; the Chinese, and by analogy, other
developing nation-states simply need time to develop laws, regula-
tions, and local customs which produce the fruits of international
cooperation.
Recent developments in Chinese law regarding copyrights
point to a progression to towards the current United States system:
Since 1996, China has introduced many new intellectual
property statutes and regulations and has entered into
various international treaties. In 1996, China issued the
Regulations on the Certification and Protection of Fa-
mous Trademarks and the Regulations on the Protection
of New Plant Varieties. China amended its Criminal
Law by including a section on intellectual property
crimes. In April 2000, China became a member of the In-
ternational Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants and subsequently enacted a law to protect trade-
mark holders against [cyber-squatters] .68
All of these laws, combined with even more efforts aimed at entering
the World Trade Organization and receiving "most favored nation"
trade status by the United States, show that the Chinese are taking
steps to apply the goals found in the TRIPS regime. 6 9 Even though
laws were passed, the problems of developing nations remain enforce-
ment mechanisms for their laws.7 ° The Chinese authorities have
launched "large scale crackdowns" on pirated and counterfeit prod-
ucts.7 1 Additionally, "Chinese leaders, through public speeches and po-
sition papers, [stress] the importance of intellectual property as an
65 Id. at 364.
66 Id.
67 HARRY HARDING, BREAKING THE IMPASSE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS, IN LIVING WITH
CHINA: U.SJCHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 165, 172 (Exra F.
Vogel ed., 1997).
68 25 CARDOZO L. REV. at 365.
69 Id. at 366-67 (listing even more statutory changes and international agree-
ments passed by China since 1996).
70 See generally 106 Yale L.J. 2659.
71 Supra note 64.
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economic strategy."7 2 Most importantly, the Chinese people have be-
come stakeholders in the system7 ' because their software industry has
experienced tremendous growth as the value of the stock market
doubled from 1995 to 1997.7' These actions and effects seem similar to
what happened with the United States when it was pirating Great
Britain's novelists.
While China is still not as vigorous about supporting intellec-
tual property rights as the United States, China is becoming a market
player and will continue to advocate stricter enforcement because the
reciprocity agreement which underlies the international framework
makes China internalize the international agreement.
Nation-states internalize international norms, especially those
which protect the rights of foreigners, because they have a vested in-
terest in following the norm. Because China has a growing software
programming industry, their businesses will begin having a vested in-
terest in the Chinese government applying the TRIPS agreement.
IV. DOWNLOADING MusIc, PIRATING SOFTWARE, AND SHRINK-WRA-P
LICENSING
The United States became more aware of copyright laws when
its younger generations began illegally procuring music from "peer to
peer networks." The President of Time Warner explained that this is a
profound historical movement.75 Pirating music is not just about indi-
viduals stealing a few songs, but it is "about an assault on everything
that constitutes the cultural expression of our society. If we fail to pro-
tect and preserve our intellectual property system, the culture will at-
rophy."7 6 The problem remains that companies or artists knowing that
the sale of their product will be diminished by the plethora of people
illegally obtaining the material, will have no incentive for creating or
developing works.7 7
The landmark case involving piracy in the United States hap-
pened when Universal Studios brought a lawsuit against Sony for
manufacturing a Betamax Videotape Recorder that allowed consumers
to tape broadcasts without separately paying for them.7 ' The United
72 25 CARDozo L. REV. at 368; see OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2003 NTIONA1L TRADE
EsTitATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BA\RRIERS 57 (2003).
73 Id. at 370.
74 Xue & Zheng, supra note 52, at 9.
71 Chuck Phillips, Time Warner Tunes in New Delivery Channel, LA. TiIES, July
25, 2000, at C1 (interviewing Richard Parsons, President, Time Warner).
76 id.
77 Id. (explaining "Artists will have no incentive to create").
78 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding
that taping the broadcasts were not illegal because of the fair use doctrine).
80 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 5:1
States Supreme Court held that by making the broadcast public "over
the air," that the taping constituted merely a shift in time when the
material was viewed.7 9 Therefore, the recorder was "fair use."' Be-
cause of many individuals relying on the "fair use" formula, Congress
passed legislation attempting to mitigate any harm to companies or
artists by providing copyright and generation status information on
any digital recording.8 1
If the United States, a proclaimed "champion of literary and
artistic property and one of the predominant powers advocating strong
intellectual property protection around the world" 82 cannot enforce the
law, how will any other nation, including developing nations, have
that capacity? In fact the problems associated with file sharing were
summarized by Professor Michael Froomkin:
Three technologies underlie the Internet's resistance to
control. First, the Internet is a packet switching net-
work, which makes it difficult for anyone, even a govern-
ment, to block or monitor information flows originating
from large numbers of users. Second, users have access
to powerful military-grade cryptography that can, if used
properly, make messages unreadable to anyone but the
intended recipient. Third, and resulting from the first
two, users of the Internet have access to powerful
anonymizing tools. Together, these three technologies
mean that anonymous communication is within the
reach of anyone with access to a personal computer and a
link to the Internet unless a government practices very
strict access control, devotes vast resources to monitor-
ing, or can persuade its population (whether by liability
rules or criminal law) to avoid using these tools.8 3
It seems that this Internet culture can become a haven for pirates.8 4
Some download music specifically as a "kind of protest movement
against record companies,"8 5 which is justified because "many artists
hate [them] because they have control over access to the music mar-
ket." This problem necessitated more legislation, like the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act, which strengthened copyright protection in
79 Id.
80 id.
81 Audio Home Recordings Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 STAT. 4247.
82 25 CARDOZO L. REV. at 375.
83 A. Michael Froomkin, "The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage", in
Borders in Cyberspace 129, 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).84 25 Cardozo L. Rev. at 383.
85 Id.
H6 Id.
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the digital medium.8 7 Most importantly, this new law sought to impose
liability on ordinary citizens to make noncommercial behavior illegal
on the theory that the law will prevent piracy."8 This law disallows
certain acts which were justified at common law because of the time-
shifting exclusion to the "fair use doctrine."8 9 Again, this makes ordi-
nary citizens stakeholders so that the laws become internalized in
society.90
Although litigation between the recording industry and indi-
viduals might enforce the laws in the United States, some claim that
the cost and lack of requisite infrastructure bar other nations from do-
ing the same without the help of non-governmental and inter-govern-
mental organizations.9 1 As an alternative, some scholars suggest a
strategy whereby "shrink-wrap licenses" enforce user agreements on
all computer software.9 2 "Shrink-wrap licenses" provide that any
owner of a piece of software agrees to the "user agreement" by merely
removing the plastic wrapping around the product.93 The user agree-
ments also include provisions about when copying the software is le-
gal, and in what limited instances the copyrighted work can be
digitally multiplied.9 4
"Shrink-wrap licenses" are valuable for many reasons. First,
they cut down the time required to individually contract with each con-
sumer regarding the rights and responsibilities of owning the product.
Second, they provide a favorable and uniform agreement for the devel-
oper. This entices software programmers to create more innovative
products because programmers know they will receive compensation
by all who use their product. Third, they allow developers additional
protection for their software during litigation.9 5 This seems like a good
87 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-204, 112 STAT. 2860 (1998)
(making illegal the action of downloading music for private use).
" See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Villen-
nium," 23 COLUiM.-VIA J.L. & ARTS 137 (1999).
"9 Compare note 74 with note 83.
90 See generally supra note 19.
91 See generally 116 HARV. L. REV. at 1159.
9 See generally Nathan Smith, Comment, The Shrinkwrap Snafu: Untangling the
"Extra Element" in Breach of Contract Claims Based on Shrinkwrap Licenses,
2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1373.
9' See generally Kell Corrigan Mercer, Note, Shrink-Wrap Licenses: Consumer
Shrink-Wrap Licenses and Public Domain Materials: Copyright Preemption and
Uniform Commercial Code Validity in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1287 (1997).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1385.
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solution for the problems faced by developing nation-states as dis-
cussed above.96
However, there might be some problems with national contract
law depending on the nation-state. In the United States, this law has
become quite controversial because "[clourts have yet to reach a con-
sensus on whether [shrink-wrap licenses], backed by state contract
law, should be preempted by federal copyright law."97 Generally,"shrink-wrap licensing" violates the common law traditions of both the
United States and Great Britain because there is no assent or consid-
eration as required for contract formation when the "shrink-wrap" is
broken.9 s Additionally these types of licenses might be adhesion con-
tracts because there is no "meeting of the minds" as consumers and no
negotiating terms with producers.9 9 Nevertheless, their simplicity of
enforcement might make them ideal in other nations where adhesion
contracts are viewed in an acceptable light and the government's opin-
ion is caveat emptor.
Another alternative lies in nations adopting a copyright law
with a "fair use doctrine" as in the United States.'0 0 This exception to
copyright law insulates individuals from prosecution for otherwise ille-
gal behavior by claiming that their use of the copyrighted work did not
violate the spirit of the law which aimed at protecting the copyright
holder. The question then becomes whether the United States' "fair
use doctrine" is truly equitable. The four pronged test of the fair use
doctrine asks the tribunal to consider: (1) the commercial nature, char-
acter, and purpose of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work that was
used; and (4) "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work."' 0' 1 This alternative mandates an equi-
table judicial infrastructure as the power of the Copyright Act makes"shrink-wrap licenses" unnecessary, because an alternate enforcement
mechanism would exist. ' 0 2
For example, in a world without ["shrink-wrap licenses"],
where a party purchases software and later makes unau-
thorized commercial use of it, copyright law would en-
96 See infra pt. II.
97 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. at 1373.
98 Gary L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Licenses: 2B or Not 2B?, 52
FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 101-03 (1999).
99 Brett L. Tolman, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: The End Does Not Justify the
Means in Federal Copyright Analysis, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (1998) (implying
that the extra element of bargain does not exist with shrinkwrap contracts be-
cause they of their adhesive quality).
100 See 17 U.S.C. §301(2000); 112 STAT. 2860, supra note 83.
'0' 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000).
102 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. at 1415.
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sure a fair solution. The accused infringer may assert a
digital fair use defense, but a court would likely dismiss
the fair use defense due to the commercial nature of the
use and its effect on the product's market. Of course, in
other situations where a fair use exists, a court will prob-
ably find against infringement. 103
In our case, developing nation-states could work up to such a standard
by slowly implementing the laws, rules, and local customs
necessary. o4
Although the solution might be inequitable with certain na-
tion-states' legal traditions, -shrink-wrap licensing" is an incredibly ef-
ficient solution to the problem of piracy because it does not need a
complicated enforcement mechanism or sophisticated consumers to
create detailed contracts about when copies of work product can be
made.
V. CONCLUSION
Any attempt to show how the corporations, artists, and inven-
tors in the United States lose money as well as the desire to create
innovative products or music depends on who the recipients of the free
items are. This comment explained how the United States sets an ex-
ample for other nation-states through TRIPS; non-governmental orga-
nizations, privatizing enforcement of copyrights, shrink-wrap
licensing, or helping establish "fair use doctrines" of copyright laws in
other nations.
Basically, TRIPS may succeed where unilateral coercion has
failed. Specifically, unilateral measures first enacted by treaties be-
tween China and the United States 10 5 threaten Chinese sovereignty,
or any nation-state in that position. Control over internal affairs is es-
sential for any government. 1 0 6 Providing a relatively neutral forum for
nation-states to air disputes. and provisions guarding against negative
side effects of overzealous enforcement, makes TRIPS a natural com-
promise, which is subject to evolution as circumstances and consensus
permit. 10 7 This means the United States is a party with a vested inter-
est in the same way as all other nation-states in the TRIPS agreement.
Time will reveal innovations in products from other nation-states who
103 id.
104 See infra part III.
1" Supra note 49.
106 Warren Newberry, Note, Copyright Reform in China: A "TRIPS" Much Shorter
and Less Strange Than Imagined, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1425, 1461 (2003).
107 Id.; see also WTO, Commission Report is Food For Though on Intellectual
Property, (Sept. 17, 2002), at httpJ/www.wto.org/english/newsenews02e/com-re-
portintelprop_ 17sep02_e/htm.
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will then become greater stakeholders in the system."10 One might ex-
pect that these nations follow the pattern established by the United
States and China. By internalizing the international law, it will be-
come part of the local legal tradition and have a greater likelihood of
being accepted and followed.
Alternatively, it is beneficial for developing nations to join in
multi-governmental entities, like the World Trade Organization, to en-
force international agreements. In the case of China, this "admittance
was accompanied by promises from the Chinese government to revise
existing intellectual property laws and abide by the provisions of
TRIPS."' 9 Making inter-governmental and non-governmental organi-
zations more transparent will aid in member nation-states believing
they have a stake in upholding their international agreements. 1 o
Finally, while promoting the United States' view of the "fair
use doctrine""' may seem hegemonic, consider the large benefit to in-
ternational corporations and consumers which exists by fostering a ba-
sic framework of contracts and build from that structure. Ultimately, a
protective international copyright agreement will be enforced by other
nation-states currently harboring pirates counting their bounty if the
United States shares its intellectual, social and local customs with
them.
108 Compare note 41 (discussing United States action once they had writers whose
works were being pirated) with note 70 (showing the increase in Chinese legisla-
tion once their software production doubled).
109 Andrew Evans, Note, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS, and
Chinese Amendments to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
587, 616 (2003).
110 Supra note 19.
111 Supra note 99.
